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THAR BE TREASURE HERE: 
RIGHTS TO ANCIENT SHIPWRECKS IN 
INTERNATIONAL WATERS—A NEW 
POLICY REGIME 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Who owns the remains and contents of ancient shipwrecks found on 
the high seas?1 The finder? The nation under whose flag the sunken ship 
originally sailed? The culture from which the wreck and artifacts 
originated? With the discovery of the RMS Titanic in 1985, a flurry of 
academic activity arose addressing the ambiguities of the maritime laws 
concerning wrecks and salvage.2 A debate ensued over the ownership of 
new wrecks, which were being recovered from greater and greater depths.3 
Treasure hunters4 who found the wrecks were placed at odds with 
governments that claimed title.5 In addition, a movement arose advocating 
the idea of “cultural property,” whereby these ancient wrecks belonged 
either to the whole of humanity or to the culture from whence they 
originated, mooting the issue of title for the finder.6 The most recent 
international attempt to overhaul the system, the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea,7 did little to resolve the ambiguity of 
 
 
 1. The high seas include “all parts of the sea that are not included in the exclusive economic 
zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of any State, or in the archipelagic waters of any 
archipelagic State.” United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 86, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 
U.N.T.S. 397, 21 I.L.M. 1261 [hereinafter UNCLOS].  
 2. The discovery of the Titanic brought a resurgence of interest in the laws of salvage and finds. 
See THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW 844 n.1 (4th ed. 2004) (citing 
numerous articles on this topic).  
 3. See H. Peter Del Bianco, Jr., Note, Underwater Recovery Operations in Offshore Waters: 
Vying for Rights to Treasure, 5 B.U. INT’L L.J. 153, 153–58 (1987) (presenting the different groups 
vying for rights to underwater wrecks); see also SCHOENBAUM, supra note 2, at 844 n.1, for additional 
articles addressing the complex issues arising from the discovery of underwater wrecks. 
 4. The term “treasure hunters” encompasses a number of different groups. In addition to 
privately funded ventures (such as Mel Fisher’s recovery of the Nuestra Señora de Atocha), there are 
now publicly held companies that specialize in deep-water shipwreck searches, recovery, and 
marketing. See, e.g., infra note 33 (describing one such for-profit company, Odyssey Marine 
Exploration. Scientists and researchers also have an interest in the discovery and recovery of ancient 
shipwrecks, but the term “treasure hunters” may not be the appropriate moniker.  
 5. Del Bianco, supra note 3, at 155–56. 
 6. See infra Part VI for a discussion of cultural property and the implications for treasure 
recovery.  
 7. UNCLOS, supra note 1. Although the United States has not ratified UNCLOS, U.S. courts 
follow the framework codified in UNCLOS when adjudicating shipwreck ownership claims. See infra 
Part IV. The refusal to ratify is premised upon concerns that UNCLOS would inhibit national security. 
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wreck ownership. Many wrecks were then, and indeed are still, subjected 
to the vagaries of protracted litigation.8 Although many ideas were 
presented to create UNCLOS, the law remains in need of reform.9  
In the wake of the influx of new ideas into this antiquated area of law, 
little has changed. More than twenty years since the Titanic was found, we 
are no closer to a uniform treatment of wrecks that would alleviate the 
need for costly litigation. The current case of Odyssey Marine 
Exploration, Inc. v. Unidentified, Shipwrecked Vessel10 demonstrates the 
high stakes involved in such litigation and highlights the need to resolve 
the issue of ownership for ancient wrecks found in international waters.11 
In this lawsuit, Odyssey Marine Exploration12 and the Kingdom of Spain 
are battling in U.S. federal court, in the middle district of Florida, over the 
rights to a wreck whose treasure is estimated at a value of $500 million.13  
In cases adjudicated by U.S. federal courts, a new policy is needed.14 
Since wrecks found in international waters are not subject to the 
sovereignty of any nation, an international structure15 is needed to replace 
national sovereignty. Through such a structure, U.S. federal courts can 
adjudicate the rights of parties who assert their ownership claims in that 
forum.16 This new regime should strive to (1) alleviate the burdens of 
litigation by clarifying the issue of ownership in ancient wrecks, (2) create 
incentives for the retrieval and preservation of ancient wrecks, and (3) 
provide a mechanism for the repatriation of ancient cultural property to the 
rightful nations. 
Part III of this Note will use the current case of Odyssey Marine 
Exploration, Inc. v. Unidentified, Shipwrecked Vessel17 as an exemplar to 
 
 
See Kevin Drawbaugh, U.S. Senate panel backs Law of Sea treaty, REUTERS, Oct. 31, 2007, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSN31335584. 
 8. See, e.g., infra note 19 (discussing the litigation surrounding the discovery of the RMS 
Titanic). 
 9. UNCLOS contains 320 articles, in addition to the provisions contained in the annexes, 
addressing issues ranging from environmental protections to marine research to navigational markings 
requirements. UNCLOS, supra note 1.  
 10. No. 8:07-CV-00616 (M.D. Fla. filed Apr. 9, 2007). 
 11. See UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 86, for a definition of high seas. This Note uses the terms 
“high seas” and “international waters” interchangeably.  
 12. See infra note 33, for a brief description of Odyssey Marine Exploration.  
 13. See infra note 34, for an estimate of the value of Odyssey’s find.  
 14. Federal courts have jurisdiction over such cases brought in the United States. See U.S. 
CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 15. The ideal international structure is an amendment to the current UNCLOS treaty. See 
discussion infra Part VII.  
 16. See UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 89 (stating that no state can subject “any part of the high 
seas to its sovereignty”). 
 17. No. 8:07-CV-00616 (M.D. Fla. filed Apr. 9, 2007). 
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address the current state of the maritime law used in the United States and 
embodied in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. 
Specifically, it will address shipwrecks located in international waters. 
Part IV examines the law of salvage and the law of finds while Part V 
discusses the present statutory mechanisms that determine ownership in 
situations other than wrecks on the high seas. After highlighting the 
shortcomings in the present state of the law, Part VI examines the 
arguments in favor of and against a theory of cultural property. Finally, 
Part VII presents policy recommendations for an amendment to the 
UNCLOS Treaty that addresses the three goals listed above while 
balancing the interests of the various parties vying for ownership rights.  
II. THE CONFLICT 
Whenever a wreck is discovered and recovered on the high seas, 
conflict may arise between the various parties who might wish to assert 
ownership claims. Such discoveries often prompt litigation to determine 
ownership rights to wrecks and their contents.18 Litigation is both costly 
and time consuming.19 The costs of litigation add to the already expensive 
costs of mounting an expedition to find and recover these wrecks.20 
Because of ambiguities in the law, as interpreted by U.S. federal courts, 
multiple parties may assert ownership claims: The first finder may assert 
claims against subsequent finders; the previous owner may assert a claim 
against the finder; and, depending upon the location and nation of origin of 
the wreck, national or state governments may assert ownership claims.21 
 
 
 18. For a comprehensive survey of a variety of different cases, see SCHOENBAUM, supra note 2, 
at 849 n.32.  
 19. The remains of the RMS Titanic were discovered in 1985, but lawsuits concerning that 
discovery persist to this day. See, e.g., R.M.S. Titanic, Inc. v. Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel, 435 F.3d 
521 (4th Cir. 2006). 
 20. “[D]eep-water survey instruments remain the province of high-powered research 
organizations and well-sponsored private companies.” Roderick Mather, Technology and the Search 
for Shipwrecks, 30 J. MAR. L. & COM. 175, 182 (1999). For example, the Mary Rose cost $7 million to 
recover, while the Atocha cost $2 million and four lives. Timothy T. Stevens, The Abandoned 
Shipwreck Act of 1987: Finding the Proper Ballast for the States, 37 VILL. L. REV. 573, 591, 585 
(1992).  
 21. See, e.g., Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 569 
F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1978) (awarding title to the finder when the United States government asserted title 
to a Spanish vessel found outside of American territorial waters). For a comprehensive survey of 
various conflicts, see Stevens, supra note 20, at 575–77 & n.8. For wrecks found within the territorial 
waters of a nation, national laws can potentially dictate ownership rights. For example, the Abandoned 
Shipwreck Act grants to the United States title to all abandoned shipwrecks found with the territorial 
waters of the United States. 43 U.S.C. § 2105 (2000). See discussion infra Part V. 
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Although numerous parties may have standing to assert claims under the 
current law, many others with putative claims are without recourse.  
In addition to owners, finders, and governments, others often wish to 
protect and preserve shipwrecks for their non-market value to science and 
to society. Shipwrecks can have non-monetary value in the form of 
cultural or archaeological worth.22 Archaeologists and salvors disagree 
over the proper methods to use in salvage in order to preserve shipwrecks’ 
archaeological value.23 “At the center of this conflict is a difference in 
preference between preserving historic shipwrecks on the sites where they 
are discovered and the belief that shipwrecks are in ‘marine peril’ and 
need to be salvaged to be protected.”24  
Besides those who wish to protect shipwrecks for their scientific value, 
many assert that shipwrecks represent cultural property in one form or 
another.25 For proponents of a cultural property classification, litigation is 
inadequate because they lack standing. However, specially created statutes 
and treaties have been used as a means to protect certain wrecks from the 
ownership claims of other claimholders.26 For example, Congress passed 
special legislation to protect the wrecked RMS Titanic.27 Specially passed 
laws are usually the most effective means of redress concerning the 
disposition of shipwrecks in international waters for proponents of cultural 
property.28 Unfortunately, these means are often cumbersome.29  
 
 
 22. See infra note 157 (discussing the different values archaeologists and treasure hunters ascribe 
to the same objects).  
 23. See D. K. Abbass, A Marine Archaeologist Looks at Treasure Salvage, 30 J. MAR. L. & COM. 
261, 261 (1999). Abbass, an archaeologist himself, raises the issue of the different standards employed 
by salvors and archaeologists. “What non-archaeologists may see as overly fastidious, we see as a 
commitment to the public benefits of good science.” Id. at 262. Among other complaints raised by 
archaeologists, there are concerns that salvors’ needs to quickly maximize profits lead to sacrifices in 
scientific methodology and that the study of artifacts cannot continue once they have been sold to 
private collections. Id. at 263.  
 24. Ole Varmer, The Case Against the “Salvage” of Cultural Heritage, 30 J. MAR. L. & COM. 
279, 279 (1999). See infra notes 58–59 and accompanying text (discussing “marine peril”). 
 25. See infra Part VI (discussing the cultural property perspective). 
 26. See, e.g., Agreement concerning the wreck of the CSS Alabama, U.S.-Fr., Oct. 30, 1989, 
T.I.A.S. No. 11687, available at http://untreaty.un.org/unts/120001_144071/19/6/00015793.pdf 
(calling for joint administration of the CSS Alabama wreck, located in French waters). 
 27. R.M.S. Titanic Maritime Memorial Act of 1986, 16 U.S.C. § 450rr (2000). The Act provides 
that the United States will enter into negotiations with other nations to develop an agreement which 
designates R.M.S. Titanic as an international maritime memorial. Id. § 450rr-4(a). One purpose served 
by this is to protect the site from activities which would alter, disturb, or salvage the vessel. Id. 
§ (b)(4). The Act specifically denies that the United States has any sovereignty over the site or 
property. Id. § 450rr-6. Thus, the Act only applies to United States citizens. The primary mechanism of 
the Act is the provision requiring the U.S. government to negotiate an international protective measure. 
Id. § 450rr-3(a). 
 28. Lawrence J. Kahn, Comment, Sunken Treasures: Conflicts Between Historical Preservation 
Law and the Maritime Law of Finds, 7 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 595, 638 (1994). Since the current litigation 
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There are presently a number of conflicts between those parties 
currently represented in litigation and those wishing to assert a voice.30 
The existing litigation structure does not afford standing to all potential 
stakeholders.31 To better accommodate all parties, the international 
community should reform the current legal framework for resolving 
ownership claims to shipwrecks in international waters.  
III. CASE STUDY BACKGROUND 
In March of 2007, an American shipwreck exploration company 
located what could be the most valuable find of treasure to date.32 In a 
story that evokes images of buccaneers and swashbucklers on the high 
seas, Odyssey Marine Exploration33 revealed that it had recovered a 
treasure-trove of coins and artifacts that may potentially be worth 
hundreds of millions of dollars.34 After maintaining complete secrecy 
throughout its operation, Odyssey recovered an unknown amount of 
treasure and transported it back to the United States.35 Odyssey has neither 
 
 
framework only recognizes claims by finders, owners, or governments, proponents of cultural property 
must resort to other means to secure their objectives. “It is clear that the best protection the 
government can offer a sunken vessel in international waters is a statute that protects the shipwreck 
from American salvors and obligates the government to enter into treaties with foreign nations to 
respect the archaeological value of the wreck.” Id.  
 29. The R.M.S. Titanic Maritime Memorial Act of 1986 is an example of the cumbersome nature 
of these special statutes. 16 U.S.C. § 450rr; see supra note 27. No nation may subject any portion of 
the high seas to its sovereignty. UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 89. In order to protect a particular wreck, 
Congress would need to pass a preservation law specific to that site. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 450rr. Such 
a law would only be enforceable against American citizens. To achieve international protection, the 
law would additionally require that the United States enter into negotiations with other nations to enact 
similar laws against their respective citizens. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 450rr-3(a). This process would 
need to be repeated for each shipwreck with each foreign nation.  
 30. See generally Abbass, supra note 23, for a thoughtful discussion of the archaeologists’ 
perspectives.  
 31. See, e.g., Editorial, Whose Treasure Is It Really?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2007, at A18 
(discussing the possible claims by Spain’s former colonies, such as Peru).  
 32. Terry Aguayo, A Bountiful Undersea Find, Sure to Invite Debate, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 
2007, at A9. 
 33. Odyssey Marine Exploration (“Odyssey”) is an American company founded in 1994, which 
went public in 1997. Odyssey Marine Exploration Company Overview, http://shipwreck.net/ 
companyoverview.html (last visited May 8, 2008). Odyssey currently trades on the NASDAQ Stock 
Market under the symbol OMEX. Id. The company specializes in commercial deep-water shipwreck 
search, recovery, and marketing. Id.  
 34. Although Odyssey has not announced the value of the find, it is speculated to be worth 
around $500 million. Greg Allen, Mystery, Legal Fight Surround Shipwreck Treasure, ALL THINGS 
CONSIDERED, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO, July 5, 2007, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php? 
storyId=11759831. 
 35. Aguayo, supra note 32. The company’s secrecy is so great that the wreck is referred to only 
by its code name, “Black Swan.” Allen, supra note 34. According to Greg Stemm, one of Odyssey’s 
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identified the wreck nor revealed its location.36 All that has been said is 
that the wreck lies at a depth of 1100 meters in international waters, 
approximately 100 miles west of the Straits of Gibraltar.37 Although 
Odyssey has remained silent on the point, the sunken vessel is rumored to 
be the Spanish frigate Nuestra Señora de las Mercedes, which was sunk 
by British warships in 1804.38 
Upon announcing its find, Odyssey filed an action in United States 
District Court for the Middle District of Florida seeking a declaratory 
judgment naming Odyssey as the “true, sole and exclusive owner of the 
Abandoned Shipwrecked Vessel and any items recovered therefrom.”39 In 
response to Odyssey’s filing, the Kingdom of Spain intervened, asserting 
ownership of the wreck and its contents in the event that the ship is 
determined to be a Spanish vessel.40 The issue of ownership will likely 
remain mired in federal court for some time. Given the great expense of 
undersea exploration and recovery, and the high value of this find, 
Odyssey clearly has a very large stake in the outcome.41  
 
 
founders, “The only thing we’re saying right now is that we’ve really recovered about a half-million 
coins, and a number of artifacts that are from the colonial period . . . that were in the Atlantic Ocean.” 
Allen, supra note 34. 
 36. Aguayo, supra note 32. 
 37. Verified Complaint in Admiralty in Rem para. 2, Odyssey Marine Exploration, Inc. v. 
Unidentified, Shipwrecked Vessel, No. 8:07-CV-00616 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 9, 2007) [hereinafter “Verified 
Complaint”]. 
 38. John Ward Anderson, Will Finders Be Keepers of Salvaged Treasure?, WASH. POST, Aug. 
27, 2007, at A1. The Nuestra Señora de las Mercedes allegedly went down somewhere south of 
Portugal’s Cape St. Mary with more than a million freshly minted silver dollars aboard. Id. 
 39. Verified Complaint, supra note 37, para. (c). In addition, Odyssey sought a declaratory 
judgment that the wreck was subject to either the law of finds or the law of salvage, as well as a 
declaratory judgment that no government had the jurisdiction or authority to interfere with Odyssey’s 
exploration and recovery of the wreck. Id. paras. (a), (b). In the alternative, in the event that another 
party was adjudged to be owner, Odyssey sought a salvage award. Id. para. (d).  
 40. Verified Claim of the Kingdom of Spain, Odyssey Marine Exploration, Inc. v. Unidentified, 
Shipwrecked Vessel, No. 8:07-CV-00616 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 9, 2007) [hereinafter “Verified Claim”]. 
Spain has a standing policy of nonabandonment for all of its shipwrecked vessels around the world. 
Spain has stated that: 
In accordance with Spanish and international law, Spain has not abandoned or otherwise 
relinquished its ownership or other interests with respect to such vessels and/or its contents, 
except by specific action pertaining to particular vessels or property taken by Royal Decree or 
Act of Parliament in accordance with Spanish law . . . . 
 The Embassy of Spain accordingly wishes to give notice that salvage or other disturbance 
of sunken vessels or their contents in which Spain has such interests is not authorized and 
may not be conducted without express consent by an authorized representative of the 
Kingdom of Spain. 
Protection of Sunken Warships, Military Aircraft, and Other Sunken Government Property, 69 Fed. 
Reg. 5647 (Feb. 5, 2004). 
 41. Unlike the relatively inexpensive techniques and technologies used for shallow-water 
searches, “deep-water survey instruments remain the province of high-powered research organizations 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss1/4
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That the discovery by Odyssey has resulted in litigation is not 
surprising given the ambiguities in maritime and salvage law. Odyssey 
anticipated such litigation when it recovered the wreck.42 Some have 
argued that the lawsuit fails to include all the parties who might wish to 
assert a claim, such as the nations in which the treasure coins were mined 
and minted.43 However, within the current legal framework, there is no 
mechanism whereby such a claim could be asserted.44 For now, the parties 
in this case are limited to Odyssey and the Kingdom of Spain, both vying 
for title to the deep-sea treasure.45  
The outcome of Odyssey’s case will depend largely upon whether the 
court decides to apply the law of finds or the law of salvage.46 The court’s 
decision will affect whether Odyssey will be vested with title to the wreck 
and treasure or whether it will be entitled to possession and a salvage 
award. The necessity of such costly legal wrangling highlights the need for 
reform in this antiquated area of law.  
IV. LAW OF SALVAGE VS. LAW OF FINDS 
The laws of salvage and finds provide two different methods for 
rewarding those who set out to recover shipwrecks. The determination of 
which law applies will impact the manner in which a finder/salvor is 
compensated for his or her efforts. The two laws cannot be simultaneously 
applied because, according to the Fourth Circuit, “The doctrines serve 
 
 
and well-sponsored private companies.” Mather, supra note 20, at 182. 
 42. According to an Odyssey statement, 
We do believe that most shipwrecks we recover, including the “Black Swan,” will likely 
result in claims by other parties. Many will be spurious claims, but we anticipate that there 
might be some legitimate ones as well. In the case of the “Black Swan,” it is the opinion of 
our legal counsel that even if a claim is deemed to be legitimate by the courts, Odyssey 
should still receive title to a significant majority of the recovered goods.  
Odyssey Marine Exploration, Odyssey Provides “Black Swan” Shipwreck Information Update (May 
21, 2007), available at http://shipwreck.net/pr135.html. 
 43. Editorial, supra note 31. This editorial suggests that Spain’s former colonies in Latin 
America be permitted to assert ownership claims over the treasure, under the theory that the treasure 
was likely looted from these colonies. Id. Such arguments are based upon a theory of cultural property. 
See discussion infra Part V.  
 44. Under the finds/salvage dichotomy, the court will either grant title to the finder or affirm the 
property rights of the known owner. Since the wreck is located on the high seas, there are no 
applicable national laws which affect ownership rights. Within such a framework, there is no means by 
which proponents of cultural property can establish standing. See infra Part VI. 
 45. Spain’s claim is premised on the possibility that the vessel is Spanish. If the vessel is found 
to be a Spanish ship that was owned by the government of Spain at the time it sank, then Spain could 
have a claim as the successor owner of the vessel.  
 46. See infra Part IV for a discussion of the law of finds and the law of salvage; see also infra 
notes 57 and 67 and accompanying text for lists of the elements required to apply the two areas of law.  
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different purposes and promote different behaviors.”47 The law of salvage 
“gives potential salvors incentives to render voluntary and effective aid to 
people and property in distress,” while the law of finds “expresses the 
acquisitive principle of finders, keepers.”48 What differentiates the two 
doctrines is the disposition of ownership. Under the law of salvage, the 
salvor is entitled to possession of the property and an award, but not title.49 
In contrast, the law of finds vests the finder with title to the property that 
he or she finds and recovers.50 
The determination of which law applies to a shipwreck rests upon 
whether the property can be considered “abandoned” in the legal sense of 
the term. It is not sufficient that the crew of a sinking vessel decided to 
“abandon ship” and is thus no longer in possession or control of the vessel. 
More is needed for a court to rule that a shipwreck is abandoned, but how 
much more and what facts are needed is unclear. The legal test for 
abandonment in the context of shipwreck discoveries is ambiguous.51 As a 
result, application of the law of salvage or the law of finds is 
unpredictable.  
A. Salvage 
A primary concern of salvage law is the preservation and protection of 
property on oceans and waterways.52 To this end, the law of salvage is 
directed toward creating incentives for salvors to recover wrecks. Salvage 
law “gives potential salvors incentives to render voluntary and effective 
aid to people and property in distress at sea.”53 The courts may reward a 
salvor’s successful efforts by authorizing a salvage award to be drawn 
from the proceeds of the sale of the salvaged property.54 “Without some 
promise of remuneration, salvors might understandably be reluctant to 
 
 
 47. R.M.S. Titanic, Inc. v. Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel, 435 F.3d 521, 531–32 (4th Cir. 2006). 
 48. Id. 
 49. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 2, at 839, 851. 
 50. Id. at 851.  
 51. See generally John Paul Jones, The United States Supreme Court and Treasure Salvage: 
Issues Remaining After Brother Jonathan, 30 J. MAR. L. & COM. 205 (1999), for a discussion of the 
ambiguities that remain in determining abandonment after the Supreme Court’s decision in California 
v. Deep Sea Research, Inc., 523 U.S. 491 (1998). For example, there is a split between circuits 
regarding the question of whether lapse of time is sufficient to infer abandonment. Jones, supra, at 
214–15. 
 52. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 2, at 851. 
 53. R.M.S. Titanic, Inc. v. Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel, 435 F.3d 521, 531 (4th Cir. 2006). 
 54. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 2, at 839. “The court has discretion to fix the [salvage] award, 
upon consideration and weighing the benefit conferred upon the property owner and the risks of the 
salvage operation.” Id. 
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undertake the often dangerous and costly efforts necessary to provide 
others with assistance.”55 The value of the salvage award can be as high as 
the value of the property saved, but cannot exceed that value.56 
In order to apply the law of salvage, three elements must be present: (1) 
marine peril, (2) voluntary service, and (3) successful recovery.57 There is, 
however, no consensus as to what constitutes marine peril. Logically, it 
would seem that a shipwreck, having already sunk or been lost, is past the 
point of facing marine peril. However, “peril” can still exist because 
“[m]arine peril includes more than the threat of storm, fire, or piracy to a 
vessel in navigation.”58 Once a shipwreck is found, the risk of being lost 
again is threatening enough to constitute a marine peril.59 
The remaining two elements are easily established and require little 
explanation. The second element, voluntary service, simply requires that 
the salvor not be under any preexisting duty to render aid.60 The final 
element, successful recovery, merely requires that a salvor demonstrate 
some degree of success. Successful recovery does not require recovery of 
the entirety of the lost property, but rather recovery of any property.61 
B. Finds 
Finds law is primarily concerned with title to the found property.62 
“The common law of finds treats property that is abandoned as returned to 
 
 
 55. R.M.S. Titanic, 435 F.3d at 531. “The policy of the law is to grant salvage awards that 
encourage seamen and others to incur risk to go to the aid of vessels in distress, but to avoid windfalls 
of unreasonable extravagance.” SCHOENBAUM, supra note 2, at 840. 
 56. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 2, at 840. 
 57. In order to assert a valid salvage claim, 
(1) there must be a marine peril placing the property at risk of loss, destruction, or 
deterioration; (2) the salvage service must be voluntarily rendered and not required by an 
existing duty or by special contract; and (3) the salvage efforts must be successful, in whole 
or in part.  
SCHOENBAUM, supra note 2, at 833. 
 58. Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 569 F.2d 330, 
337 (5th Cir. 1978).  
 59. Id. But see Varmer, supra note 24, at 280–81, for the premise that the recovery efforts 
themselves subject a wreck to marine peril. “Exploration which involves disturbing the seabed as well 
as any subsequent salvage actually places the site in marine peril.” Id. at 281. Varmer instead 
advocates “on-site preservation,” contradicting the claim that a shipwreck is in marine peril by virtue 
of being on the bottom of the ocean. Id. at 287–95. No court yet accepts this argument.  
 60. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 2, at 833. An example where this element is not met is if the 
salvor is engaged by contract to recover a shipwreck for a specified price. The salvor cannot render the 
service and then demand a salvage award from a court. The duty imposed by the contract violates the 
element of voluntary service.  
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 849.  
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the state of nature and thus equivalent to property, such as fish or ocean 
plants, with no prior owner.”63 Accordingly, under finds law, ancient 
wrecks are treated as having no prior owner.64 However, some courts are 
hesitant to apply the law of finds in the context of ancient shipwrecks.65 
“Admiralty favors the law of salvage over the law of finds because salvage 
law's aims, assumptions, and rules are more consonant with the needs of 
marine activity and because salvage law encourages less competitive and 
secretive forms of conduct than finds law.”66 
In order to apply the law of finds in the context of shipwrecks, three 
elements must be present: (1) intent to reduce property to possession, (2) 
actual possession, and (3) abandonment.67 Usually, the first two elements 
are easily shown. Actual possession does not require that a finder recover 
the entire wreck; the recovery of a single item from a wreck can be 
sufficient to show possession.68  
The final element, abandonment, often determines whether the law of 
salvage or the law of finds will apply. “Abandonment under the law of 
finds must be shown by clear and convincing evidence.”69 This 
requirement is usually satisfied by either an express statement of 
abandonment by an owner or, in the case of ancient shipwrecks, a lack of 
intervention by anyone claiming ownership.70 However, in the case of 
ancient shipwrecks, courts may not find abandonment.71 With ancient 
 
 
 63. Hener v. United States, 525 F. Supp. 350, 354 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
 64. R.M.S. Titanic, Inc. v. Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel, 435 F.3d 521, 532 (4th Cir. 2006) 
(“More recently, the doctrine has been applied to long-lost or abandoned shipwrecks, which, having 
once been owned, are no longer the property of anyone and so revert to the state of nature.”). 
 65. Id. at 531 (“The law of finds, however, is a disfavored common-law doctrine rarely applied 
to wrecks and then only under limited circumstances.”).  
 66. Hener, 525 F. Supp. at 356. 
 67. R.M.S. Titanic, 435 F.3d at 532 n.3 (“To establish a claim under the law of finds, a finder 
must show (1) intent to reduce property to possession, (2) actual or constructive possession of the 
property, and (3) that the property is either unowned or abandoned.”).  
 68. In addition to showing possession, courts can establish in rem jurisdiction when a finder 
brings a portion of the recovered property into the jurisdiction of the court and allows the court to take 
custody of that property. This is based upon the legal fiction that the property is indivisible; therefore, 
if part of the property is within the jurisdiction of the court, then it all must be. Under this fiction, 
federal courts are able to exercise in rem jurisdiction over shipwrecks located around the world. See 
SCHOENBAUM, supra note 2, at 846–47, for a discussion of national jurisdiction issues.  
 69. Id. at 849. 
 70. Id.; see also Adams v. Unione Mediterranea Di Sicurta, 220 F.3d 659, 671 (5th Cir. 2000) 
(discussing the actions necessary to affirmatively release title and thus abandon property under the law 
of finds). “The owner of the distressed goods on navigable waters does not lose title even though the 
property may become the subject of salvage services.” Id. at 670–71. 
 71. See, e.g., United States v. Steinmetz, 973 F.2d 212 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that the United 
States retained title to the CSS Alabama, which sank off the coast of France in 1864). The United 
States never officially abandoned the vessel. Id. at 223 n.13.  
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wrecks, the inference of abandonment arises only because it is not possible 
to ascertain the present successor to the owner. If an owner expressly 
abandons title,72 then there is no dispute that the law of finds applies. But 
such cases are rare. If an owner attempts to intervene and claim ownership, 
then the law of finds is inappropriate.73 
Use of the law of finds presents potential advantages over the law of 
salvage because finds law creates different incentives. “[T]he maritime 
law of finds vests title to persons who reduce to their possession objects 
which have been abandoned at sea.”74 One potential benefit is the 
incentive to put lost property back to productive use.75 By granting title to 
the finder, the law of finds might increase the incentive to search for long-
lost or abandoned property. Property that is subject to the law of finds is, 
by definition, abandoned. Because of this abandonment, there is a 
reasonable assumption that the true owner will not search for the property. 
Without an incentive to find the property, it might never be recovered to 
be put to use.  
Use of the law of finds may also raise concerns about the expected 
behavior of potential finders. “A would-be finder should be expected to act 
acquisitively, to express a will to own by acts designed to establish the 
high degree of control required for a finding of possession.”76 Courts have 
expressed concern for the aggressive behavior that may result from 
application of the law of finds.77 “Would-be finders are encouraged by 
these rules to act secretly, and to hide their recoveries, in order to avoid 
claims of prior owners or of other would-be finders that could entirely 
deprive them of the property.”78 While such aggressive behavior can raise 
 
 
 72. In such a context, a party may show express abandonment by a “clear and unmistakable 
affirmative act indicat[ing] a purpose to repudiate ownership.” Columbus-Am. Discovery Group v. 
Atl. Mut. Ins. Co., 974 F.2d 450, 461 (4th Cir. 1992). 
 73. See SCHOENBAUM, supra note 2, at 849. 
 74. Odyssey Marine Exploration, Inc. v. Unidentified, Shipwrecked Vessel or Vessels, No. 8:06-
cv-1685-T-23TBM, 2006 WL 3091531, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 30, 2006). 
 75. Implicit in the rationale behind the law of finds is the notion that property sitting on the 
bottom of the ocean is not being productively used; however, an archaeologist might dispute this 
claim, on the grounds that such property is invaluable for study specifically because it is located on the 
bottom of the ocean. See Abbass, supra note 23, at 262. 
 76. Hener v. United States, 525 F. Supp. 350, 356 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
 77. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. Awarding title to the first finder to reduce the 
property to possession creates an incentive to act in a manner which prevents other potential finders 
from finding the property. If the primary concern is the location and recovery of lost shipwrecks, then 
such behavior might be detrimental. It might divert resources from the tasks of search and recovery 
and instead direct them toward maintaining secrecy and quelling competition. On the other hand, such 
incentives might create a free market, where the most adept finders are rewarded for their skill and 
acumen. 
 78. Hener, 525 F. Supp. at 356. 
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alarm, it also ensures that more wrecks are sought and discovered. In 
reforming the current state of the law, the international community must 
balance these concerns with the positive incentives the law of finds 
creates. 
V. EXISTING STATUTORY SCHEMES 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”)79 
governs the international disposition of shipwrecks, and the Abandoned 
Shipwreck Act (the “ASA”)80 governs the national disposition. The two 
laws vary greatly in their applicability and the manner in which they treat 
ownership rights for shipwrecks.81 Although the ASA is not applicable to 
wrecks found in international waters, it provides an alternative approach to 
the traditional laws of salvage and finds.  
A. UNCLOS 
The present state of international sea law is embodied in UNCLOS,82 
which is the only treaty to establish rights to shipwrecks found in 
international waters.83 UNCLOS delineates the rights of nations within 
five distinct areas of jurisdiction: (1) the territorial sea,84 (2) the 
contiguous zone,85 (3) the exclusive economic zone,86 (4) the continental 
 
 
 79. UNCLOS, supra note 1. 
 80. Abandoned Shipwreck Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2106 (2000). 
 81. The ASA, passed by Congress, is binding upon U.S. courts. The United States has not signed 
UNCLOS, although the treaty is currently in effect. See infra note 82. 
 82. UNCLOS entered into force on November 16, 1994. Division of Ocean Affairs and the Law 
of the Sea, Office of Legal Affairs, Table recapitulating the status of the Convention and of the related 
Agreements, as at 16 July 2008, available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/status 
2008.pdf.  
 83. Anne M. Cottrell, Comment, The Law of the Sea and International Marine Archaeology: 
Abandoning Admiralty Law to Protect Historic Shipwrecks, 17 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 667, 671 (1994). 
 84. UNCLOS, supra note 1, arts. 2, 3. Under UNCLOS, the sovereignty of a coastal state extends 
up to twelve nautical miles. Id. 
 85. Id. art. 33. The contiguous zone extends out to twenty-four nautical miles. Id. Within the 
contiguous zone, a nation may exercise limited jurisdiction in order to “(a) prevent infringement of its 
customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations within its territory or territorial sea; (b) 
punish infringement of the above laws and regulations committed within its territory or territorial sea.” 
Id.  
 86. Id. art. 56. Within the exclusive economic zone, coastal states have:  
(a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the 
natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of 
the seabed and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation 
and exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy from the water, currents and 
winds. 
Id. The exclusive economic zone can extend as far as two hundred nautical miles. Id. art. 57. 
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shelf,87 and (5) the high seas.88 Under UNCLOS, “[n]o State may validly 
purport to subject any part of the high seas to its sovereignty.”89 Because 
no sovereign has rights to wrecks found on the high seas, this Note focuses 
only upon those provisions governing wrecks on the high seas.90 UNCLOS 
addresses the issue of shipwrecks found on the high seas in Articles 149 
and 303.91 Article 303 advances the general principle that all States must 
cooperate “to protect objects of an archaeological and historical nature 
found at sea,”92 while Article 149 states that  
[a]ll objects of an archaeological and historical nature found in the 
Area93 shall be preserved or disposed of for the benefit of mankind 
as a whole, particular regard being paid to the preferential rights of 
the State or country of origin, or the State of cultural origin, or the 
State of historical and archaeological origin.94  
Under the UNCLOS provisions, neither the law of finds nor the law of 
salvage are abrogated. “While Article 149 does not explicitly state that the 
law of finds rules the discovery of historic shipwrecks in the Area, 
commentators have suggested that the law of finds is implied because 
there is no alternative ownership principle delineated in the provision.”95 
Nor does Article 303 override the existing legal options. It states instead 
that “[n]othing in this article affects the rights of identifiable owners, the 
law of salvage or other rules of admiralty, or laws and practices with 
respect to cultural exchanges.”96 Consequently, if a wreck is found on the 
high seas, the finder/salvor must still go through the same process of 
adjudicating his or her claim either under finds law or salvage law. If the 
owner is known, and salvage law is applied, then Article 303 fails to 
 
 
 87. Id. art. 76 (establishing limit of continental shelf). “The rights of the Coastal State over the 
continental shelf do not affect the legal status of the superjacent waters . . . .” Id. art. 78(1). 
 88. The high seas include “all parts of the sea that are not included in the exclusive economic 
zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State.” Id. art. 86.  
 89. Id. art. 89.  
 90. The scope of this Note is limited to wrecks in international waters and the laws governing 
those wrecks. Because coastal states can exert varying degrees of sovereign rights over waters within 
200 miles of the coast, the laws of those coastal states can influence the disposition of shipwrecks 
found in those areas, and are, accordingly, beyond the scope of this Note. 
 91. Id. arts. 149, 303. 
 92. Id. art. 303. “States have a duty to protect objects of an archeological and historical nature 
found at sea and shall cooperate for this purpose.” Id.  
 93. UNCLOS defines the Area as “the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the 
limits of national jurisdiction.” Id. art. 1.  
 94. Id. art. 149. 
 95. Cottrell, supra note 83, at 704.  
 96. UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 303. 
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apply.97 If the wreck is abandoned, then the lack of guidance in Article 149 
suggests that the law of finds must still apply. The end result is that the 
UNCLOS provisions concerning shipwrecks in international waters do 
little to impinge on the applicability of the law of finds and the law of 
salvage. 
UNCLOS does not effectively secure the preservation of wrecks found 
on the high seas. While Article 149 discusses preservation, it fails to 
define “objects of an archaeological and historical nature.”98 Moreover, 
since Article 303 cannot affect ownership rights, it cannot effectively 
operate in the presence of an ownership claim.99 The goals of preservation 
conflict with the property rights affirmed in Article 303.100 As far as 
preservation is concerned, under UNCLOS, “[i]t is clear that the best 
protection the [U.S.] government can offer a sunken vessel in international 
waters is a statute that protects the shipwreck from American salvors and 
obligates the government to enter into treaties with foreign nations to 
respect the archaeological value of the wreck.”101 
UNCLOS does provide for the creation of an administrative body: The 
International Seabed Authority (the “Authority”).102 This Authority is 
intended to “organize and control activities in the Area.”103 Currently, it 
addresses issues of mining and exploration.104 Although UNCLOS does 
not empower anybody to dispose of shipwrecks, if such power were 
granted, the Authority would be the logical body to administer it.105  
 
 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. art. 149. “The Convention’s marine archaeology provisions, articles 149 and 303, do not 
define ‘objects of archaeological and historical nature.’” Cottrell, supra note 83, at 703. 
 99. Article 303 states that “[n]othing in this article affects the rights of identifiable owners, the 
law of salvage or other rules of admiralty, or laws and practices with respect to cultural exchanges.” 
UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 303.  
 100. See Abbass, supra note 23, at 261 (discussing some of the points of conflict between 
archaeologists and salvage lawyers).  
 101. Kahn, supra note 28, at 638; see also supra note 27 (discussing R.M.S. Titanic Maritime 
Memorial Act of 1985). This act required the United States to enter into international agreements for 
the protection of the Titanic. 16 U.S.C. § 450rr-3 to -4 (2000). “This Act supported [the discoverer’s] 
wish by preventing alteration, disturbance, and salvage of the Titanic and by requiring the United 
States to enter into international agreements to establish guidelines for the research, exploration and, if 
appropriate, salvage of the vessel.” Kahn, supra note 28, at 637. 
 102. UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 156. The seat of the International Seabed Authority is in 
Jamaica. Id. 
 103. Id. UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 157.  
 104. See UNCLOS, supra note 1, Annex III. 
 105. Under article 157, “The Authority is the organization through which State Parties shall, in 
accordance with this Part, organize and control activities in the Area, particularly with a view to 
administering the resources of the Area.” Id. art. 157 (emphasis added). The salvage and recovery of 
shipwrecks on the high seas is an “activity in the Area.” The “Area” is defined as “the seabed and 
ocean floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.” Id. art. 1.  
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B. ASA 
The ASA, passed in 1987, abrogates traditional salvage and finders law 
within the territorial waters of the United States.106 The ASA states: 
[T]he United States asserts title to any abandoned shipwreck that is: 
(1) embedded in submerged lands of a State; (2) embedded in 
coralline formations protected by a State on submerged lands of a 
State; or (3) on submerged lands of a State and is included in or 
determined eligible for inclusion in the National Register.107 
The purpose of the ASA “was to provide for state regulation of shipwrecks 
found within state coastal waters, while allowing access to historians and 
sport divers.”108 The states are granted control over shipwrecks under the 
theory that states have a responsibility for the management of certain 
abandoned wrecks.109 
Under the ASA, the federal government acquires title to any abandoned 
shipwrecks found in the territorial waters of the United States.110 The ASA 
immediately transfers title over such wrecks to the state in or on whose 
submerged lands the shipwreck is located.111 In granting to the United 
States title to all abandoned wrecks found within its territorial waters, the 
law specifically abrogates the law of finds and the law of salvage by 
preventing the finders of abandoned shipwrecks from acquiring title.112  
Many ambiguities remain under the ASA. It does not resolve the issue 
of what constitutes abandonment,113 and the Supreme Court has done little 
to resolve this ambiguity.114 The ASA is also not clear as to what 
 
 
 106. 43 U.S.C. § 2106 (2000). Other nations have taken legislative steps to protect historic 
shipwrecks within their jurisdictions. See Stevens, supra note 20, at 588–92, for a brief survey of 
historic preservation laws in France, Spain, Italy, England, and Australia.  
 107. 43 U.S.C. § 2105(a). 
 108. Denise B. Feingold, Note, The Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987: Navigating Turbulent 
Constitutional Waters?, 10 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 361, 362–63 (1990) (citing to S. REP. NO. 100–
241, at 1 (1987)). 
 109. 134 CONG. REC. H1177 (1988). 
 110. 43 U.S.C. § 2105(a). 
 111. Id. § 2105(c); see also Sea Hunt, Inc. v. Unidentified, Shipwrecked Vessel or Vessels, 47 F. 
Supp. 2d 678, 685 (E.D. Va. 1999) (“Title over a shipwreck covered under the ASA is transferred to 
the State in whose waters the wreck is located.”). 
 112. Section 2106(a) of the Act states: “The law of salvage and the law of finds shall not apply to 
abandoned shipwrecks to which section 2105 of this title applies.” 43 U.S.C. § 2106(a). 
 113. Sea Hunt, 47 F. Supp. 2d at 686 (“The ASA itself does not provide a definition of 
‘abandonment.’ Therefore, the Court must look to case law for guidance on determining the status of 
the shipwrecked vessels in this case.”). 
 114. See generally Jones, supra note 51 (discussing the ambiguities that remain in determining 
abandonment after the Supreme Court’s decision in California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc., 523 U.S. 
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constitutes a historic shipwreck, stating that it applies to wrecks that are 
“historically significant.”115 The Seventh Circuit has identified two 
methods for determining historical significance for wrecks found in 
territorial waters.116 “The court first held that ‘embeddedness’ is an indicia 
of historic significance. Second, the court held that if the shipwreck is 
eligible to be listed in the National Register, then it is historically 
significant under the ASA.”117 Further, some have questioned the 
constitutionality of the ASA on the grounds that it explicitly abrogates the 
admiralty laws of salvage and finds.118 In doing so, the ASA arguably 
deprives the federal courts of admiralty jurisdiction and allows the states 
to adjudicate the disposition of certain shipwrecks under state laws.119 
In spite of its shortcomings, the ASA also provides a number of 
benefits in the realm of preservation. Use of the ASA, as opposed to the 
law of finds, can prevent valuable historic objects from being reduced “to 
the personal property of private collectors.”120 The traditional law of finds 
and the interests of preservation are often in conflict.121 By supplanting the 
law of finds, the ASA has the potential to resolve this conflict. Under the 
ASA, the states have the authority to legislate the disposition of historic 
wrecks and their contents, and the legislative history of the ASA suggests 
that preservation is one of the goals for the States.122 Thus, with that 
authority comes the responsibility for preserving historic shipwrecks.123 
 
 
491 (1998)). 
 115. Stevens, supra note 20, at 598. “Congress, under the Act, has transferred to the states title to 
certain shipwrecks—shipwrecks of historical significance that are located on or embedded in a state’s 
submerged land.” Id.  
 116. See Zych v. Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel, Believed to Be the SB “Seabird,” 
941 F.2d 525, 529 (7th Cir. 1991), modifying 746 F. Supp. 1334 (N.D. Ill. 1990), on remand, 811 F. 
Supp. 1300 (N.D. Ill. 1992), aff’d, 19 F.3d 1136 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 117. Cottrell, supra note 83, at 698.  
 118. See, e.g., Stevens, supra note 20, at 597–98 (“For example, section 2106(a) of the Act 
provides that ‘[t]he law of salvage and the law of finds shall not apply to abandoned shipwrecks to 
which section 6 [§ 2105] of this Act applies.’ This disruption of the harmony and uniformity of 
admiralty law may be grounds for a constitutional challenge.”); see also Feingold, supra note 108, at 
391–92 (“Article III, section 2 of the Constitution gives an exclusive grant of admiralty jurisdiction to 
the federal courts. While Congress ‘may make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper’ to carry 
out the powers of government, Congress does not have the power to pass any legislation prohibited by 
any other portion of the Constitution.”). It is questionable whether Congress has the power to transfer 
jurisdiction from the federal courts to the states. Id. at 392. 
 119. “The intent of the statute is to give the states a solid foundation upon which to build a 
coherent and consistent policy towards shipwreck management and remove the obstacles laid by the 
inconsistent common law standards that previously existed.” Stevens, supra note 20, at 588. 
 120. Kahn, supra note 28, at 596.  
 121. “The implementation of the law of finds aggravates the conflicting interests of historians and 
finders of shipwrecks.” Id. at 596. 
 122. See Feingold, supra note 108, at 362–63. 
 123. Kahn, supra note 28, at 630. “By releasing control over historic shipwrecks to the states, the 
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VI. CULTURAL PROPERTY 
While cultural property is traditionally defined to include artifacts, such 
as works of art or antiquities, it can also include physical structures, such 
as buildings and shipwrecks.124 Proponents of cultural property rights are 
critical of the current legal framework used to adjudicate wrecks on the 
high seas. They feel it either fails to meet preservation concerns or gives 
inadequate voice to producers of cultural property.125 Some argue for the 
abandonment of the law of the sea in order to better preserve cultural 
heritage.126  
The cultural property rights movement advances the idea that some 
property is too important to be disposed of according to the current laws of 
property.127 The interests of mankind are not adequately represented by the 
current framework because only owners, finders, or governments have 
standing to assert a claim.128 Precious artwork presents one example where 
the abrogation of traditional property law has been important. Following 
World War II, the cultural property movement began as a response to the 
destruction and looting of artwork in Europe.129 “The destruction of 
irreplaceable historic sites due to bombings in World War II, and the loss 
of many thousands of artworks through World War II looting, prompted 
the development of new laws seeking to protect ‘cultural property.’”130 In 
 
 
ASA absolves itself of responsibility for these archaeological finds. The states, by implication, become 
the parties responsible for the protection of historic shipwrecks.” Id. It is unclear whether the states are 
any better prepared than the federal government to address the issues arising out of the discoveries of 
shipwrecks in state territorial waters.  
 124. Stephanie O. Forbes, Comment, Securing the Future of Our Past: Current Efforts to Protect 
Cultural Property, 9 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 235, 239–40 (1956). 
 125. See Kahn, supra note 28, at 630–38 (providing a number of cases in which finders or the 
government were granted title to sunken shipwrecks, which prevented efforts by preservationists to 
keep the recovered artifacts in a single collection); see also supra note 101 (discussing statutory 
protections for shipwrecked vessels). 
 126. See Cottrell, supra note 83, pt. 3. 
 127. A more specific definition of cultural property requires a distinction between the view of 
“cultural nationalism” and “cultural internationalism,” as discussed below. 
 128. See Mark F. Lindsay, Note, The Recovery of Cultural Artifacts: The Legacy of Our 
Archaeological Heritage, 22 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 165, 165 (1990). “It is well recognized in 
international law that since art is part of the cultural history of all states, conventional property 
concepts do not automatically apply.” Id. However, when a government asserts a claim to an ancient 
shipwreck, it is asserted as the successor owner of the vessel, not as the source of cultural heritage. 
This difference means that, while a government may acquire title to its lost shipwrecks, it does so 
within the traditional owner/finder framework.  
 129. M. June Harris, Who Owns the Pot of Gold at the End of the Rainbow? A Review of the 
Impact of Cultural Property on Finders and Salvage Laws, 14 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 223, 234 
(1997). 
 130. Id. 
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the context of cultural property, there is a distinction between historic 
preservation and cultural property rights.131 While the two usually overlap, 
the manner in which cultural property is defined can create a difference in 
purpose between the two policies.  
There is no consensus as to how cultural property is defined.132 One 
view urges cultural internationalism, which holds that some property has 
importance for all of humanity.133 An opposing view is cultural 
nationalism, which holds that some property is particularly important to a 
specific nation or culture.134 “The differences in the definition of cultural 
property radically affect how societies view cultural property and its 
physical placement in the world.”135  
“Cultural internationalism places more emphasis on the ability of a 
nation to preserve artifacts rather than on its cultural affiliation with the 
object.”136 Marine archaeologists who seek to preserve artifacts for study 
by mankind, as opposed to the nation or culture of origin, would espouse 
such a view. Taken to an extreme, cultural internationalism precludes 
individual ownership of property deemed to be of historical value. One 
radical approach “calls for the establishment of a distinct international 
 
 
 131. Historical preservation is more concerned with the treatment of historical objects and their 
protection than with the issue of ownership. Historical preservation can be associated with academic 
pursuits such as the study of historic objects for the advancement of science, art, etc. In contrast, 
cultural property may present broader policy concerns of national ownership, cultural heritage, and 
international access. See infra notes 134 and 141.  
 132. See Harris, supra note 129, at 235–37, for a more detailed discussion of the distinctions 
between cultural internationalism and cultural nationalism, and the tension between the two viewpoints 
in multilateral treaties; see also Kahn, supra note 28, and Anastasia Strati, Deep Seabed Cultural 
Property and the Common Heritage of Mankind, 40 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 859 (1991), for discussions 
of historical preservation in the context of sunken shipwrecks and the impact of preservation law on 
property rights.  
 133. See Harris, supra note 129. 
 134. An advocate of the importance of national culture states,  
Nowadays, where technology and mass communication tend to create an “international” 
culture, it is of primary importance to identify “national” cultural heritage. The co-existence 
of separate cultures is inevitable and it is precisely this co-existence of the various cultures 
which can furnish the substructure of a universal culture. All peoples have original cultures 
that are worthy of safeguarding. On top of this, the notion of universal heritage declares that 
those particular items of the cultural and the natural heritage that are of exceptional interest 
must be preserved as a component of the world heritage.  
Strati, supra note 132, at 861. This commentator, in addressing the dichotomy between national and 
international cultural heritage, demonstrates the difficulty in arriving at a common definition for 
cultural heritage. One’s view of cultural heritage affects the underlying purpose of any cultural 
property arguments. Support for the preservation of national cultural heritage naturally dovetails into 
the attribution of ownership of cultural property to the culture from which it originated. See infra note 
142. 
 135. Harris, supra note 129, at 235. 
 136. Id. at 236.  
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cultural heritage, a new sort of property, administered by an international 
agency, and made available to all persons to enjoy.”137 Under such a view, 
cultural property “‘belong[s]’ to all peoples.”138 
Many object that such a notion ignores that “the cultural heritage is 
always associated with a given people, and it is not possible to consider it 
outside this context.”139 Cultural internationalism places little value on the 
location of the property, so long as there is access for all. “This view of 
cultural property renders unimportant the claim that the culture that 
produced the object should control it, as long as others have the 
opportunity to see and appreciate the treasure.”140 In other words, cultural 
internationalism emphasizes access over ownership.141 So long as the 
property can be viewed and studied by all, it is irrelevant where it is 
placed. 
In contrast, the idea of cultural nationalism142 grants greater weight to 
claims by producers of cultural property.143 Under this view, nations are 
divided between art-rich and art-poor nations.144 Art-rich nations “produce 
much of the world’s art,” while art-poor nations import their art.145 “[T]he 
 
 
 137. Strati, supra note 132, at 860. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. Further, “Cultural property is the product of given socio-economic and political processes 
and should, therefore, be considered in terms of social realisations rather than aesthetic appreciations.” 
Id.  
 140. Harris, supra note 129, at 236. 
 141. Id. Cultural internationalism is a viewpoint easily associated with the archaeological 
community. The priority is to preserve historical objects for study. In order to achieve this goal, there 
must be adequate access for scholars to study the property.  
 142. One commentator offered the following definition of cultural property, consistent with the 
idea of cultural nationalism: 
Cultural property reflects a specific culture’s unique understanding of natural forces as well 
as supernatural forces. Cultural property also reflects a culture’s unique understanding of 
human relationships to each other and to these forces. Objects of cultural property are 
invested with historical and theological information, exploring simultaneously the visible and 
the conceptual worlds. Such objects are often central to the understanding of a particular 
culture. Cultural property, therefore, uniquely represents the identity of a culture in terms of a 
people’s concept of themselves, these forces and their relationships.  
Robin A. Morris, Legal and Ethical Issues in the Trade in Cultural Property, 21 N.Z. L.J. 40, 40 
(1990); see also Harris, supra note 129, at 237. 
 143. Harris, supra note 129, at 237. 
 144. See id. at 237. The dispute between Great Britain and Greece concerning ownership of the 
Elgin Marbles is an example of the case for cultural nationalism. Id. at 239. The Elgin Marbles were 
removed from the Ottoman Empire between 1801 and 1812, but no request was made for their return 
until 1983. Id. at 239. Interestingly, the Marbles were originally removed with the permission of the 
Ottoman Empire. Id. Greece argued that, in spite of the legal purchase of the Marbles, it still possessed 
cultural property rights that transcended ordinary property rights. Id. To date, the British Museum still 
contains the Elgin Marbles, although Greece has specially built a museum to house antiquities from 
the Parthenon. See http://www.newacropolismuseum.gr/eng/ (last visited Aug. 26, 2008). 
 145. Harris, supra note 129, at 237; see also Lindsay, supra note 128, at 166–68. Greece is an 
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importance of the object to a particular culture should determine 
ownership rights in an object because the cultural nationalism view sees 
the object as important to a particular culture as a symbol which unites 
them with a common heritage and identity.”146 Consequently, the physical 
location of the object is of great importance. 
Under a theory of cultural nationalism, cultural property should be 
repatriated to the nation that values that property.147 In Odyssey, this 
means that the Kingdom of Spain might assert a claim if the sunken vessel 
previously sailed under the Spanish flag. Concurrently, the nation whose 
culture is represented in the cargo can also assert a claim. For example, 
Peru might have a claim if the silver coinage originated there.148  
UNCLOS includes provisions for the preservation of cultural 
property;149 however, UNCLOS is ambiguous as to which view of cultural 
property it adopts. Article 149 begins with an expression of cultural 
internationalism: “All objects of an archaeological and historical nature 
found in the Area shall be preserved or disposed of for the benefit of 
mankind as a whole . . . .”150 Article 149 continues, however, by giving 
preference to “the State or country of origin, or the State of cultural origin, 
or the State of historical and archaeological origin.”151 Such a preference 
supports a view of cultural nationalism. 
The applicability of international agreements to wrecks on the high 
seas is questionable because no nation may assert sovereignty over 
international waters.152 “International agreements on cultural property . . . 
are generally limited to national territory, although provisions in them for 
international cooperation are perhaps of some normative significance.”153 
 
 
example of an art-rich nation. Greek antiquities have been removed by other nations and scattered 
throughout the world. The term “art-rich” is not intended to imply wealth, but rather to connote a 
producer and exporter of cultural property. The export is not necessarily voluntary.  
 146. Harris, supra note 129, at 237.  
 147. UNCLOS does not specify which culture has the primary claim to artifacts lost at sea. 
Preferential rights are to be granted to “the State or country of origin, or the State of cultural origin, or 
the State of historical and archaeological origin.” UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 149. UNCLOS does not 
provide any means of distinguishing which of these three groups, if placed in conflict, has the stronger 
right. It is also unclear how such a determination would be made.  
 Some find that cultural nationalism’s emphasis on repatriation carries negative connotations, 
harking back to such policies as Nazi Germany’s collecting of “Aryan” artwork to be brought back to 
Germany. See Harris, supra note 129, at 238.  
 148. Editorial, supra note 31. 
 149. UNCLOS, supra note 1, arts. 149, 303. 
 150. Id. art. 149.  
 151. Id.  
 152. Id. art. 89; see also supra note 89 and accompanying text.  
 153. James A.R. Nafziger, Finding the Titanic: Beginning an International Salvage of Derelict 
Law at Sea, 12 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 339, 344–45 (1987).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss1/4
 
 
 
 
 
 
2008] THAR BE TREASURE HERE 201 
 
 
 
 
The jurisdiction of coastal states under UNCLOS extends only to objects 
found within twenty-four miles of the coastline.154 Objects found on the 
high seas are not subject to any state’s jurisdiction, so the protection under 
Articles 149 and 303 is less extensive. 
VII. PROPOSAL 
Laws, such as the ASA, that abrogate traditional maritime property 
rights have the benefit of strengthening preservation efforts for historic 
wrecks. However, they can also limit the incentives to locate lost 
shipwrecks.155 “States have enacted legislation that severely limits the 
recovery of sunken treasure.”156 These shifting incentives will drive 
treasure hunters to search for wrecks to which they can assert a claim, such 
as shipwrecks found on the high seas. National historic preservation laws 
that apply within territorial waters may have the adverse effect of 
“dooming those valuable archaeological finds that are beyond the reach of 
state law”157 because there is no significant protection for wrecks found on 
the high seas.  
Resolving the issue of ownership would do much to address these 
preservation concerns. Currently, in order to acquire title to abandoned 
property, a finder must first recover some of that property to bring before 
the court.158 Such recovery can jeopardize the archaeological integrity of 
shipwreck sites. A clear statutory scheme for determining ownership 
would remove the need for potentially destructive recovery operations 
otherwise used to establish ownership. An abrogation of traditional finds 
and salvage laws, as they apply to shipwrecks on the high seas, would 
provide a basis for protecting the historical and cultural value of these 
shipwrecks found beyond the territorial waters of any nation.159 However, 
 
 
 154. Strati, supra note 132, at 863 & n.16 and accompanying text.  
 155. Kahn, supra note 28, at 641. “By reducing all shipwrecks within state territorial waters to 
state-owned property, incentives to invest time or money have foundered.” Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. Kahn posits that private treasure hunters will have no incentive to preserve the historical 
integrity of sunken shipwrecks or their contents. Id. For example, objects that are of value to science 
may not have any market value to treasure hunters or collectors. The result would be that treasure 
hunters would only focus on recovering the intrinsically valuable items (coins, armaments, etc.) and 
would ignore or destroy the remainder. “Salvors are most likely to be interested in the recovery of 
bullion, armaments, and other high-value artifacts. Historians, however, . . . are also interested in 
cookware, clothing, human remains, and the vessels themselves.” Id. at 599.  
 158. This element of control is necessary for the court to establish in rem jurisdiction over the 
property. See supra note 68. 
 159. Due to the extraterritorial nature of such wrecks, no nation has the power to subject the sites 
to its sovereignty. See UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 89. The United Nations must legitimize any 
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in order to be successful, any such reforms must include an incentive 
mechanism to remedy the inherent problem of the ASA, namely the 
disincentive to search for and recover lost shipwrecks and their treasures.  
In order to remedy the conflicts among finders/salvors, owners, 
preservationists, governments, and proponents of cultural property, the 
United Nations should amend UNCLOS to add the following: (1) a statute 
of limitations to ownership claims for shipwrecks located in international 
waters; and (2) a mechanism for the repatriation of cultural property 
(excluding coinage and armaments)160 that delineates a clear hierarchy 
among the nation of origin, the nation of cultural origin, and the nation of 
historic and archaeological origin.161  
A. Statute of Limitations 
UNCLOS should be amended to extinguish ownership claims to 
shipwrecks in international waters after 100 years.162 The provision would 
declare that a wreck is legally abandoned after the passage of 100 years.163 
 
 
alteration to the existing law.  
 160. Coins and armaments should not be included because they traditionally have the most 
monetary value of any portion of the wreck. By allowing finders to keep these items, the financial 
incentives for recovery would be maintained. This is a compromise position between granting finders 
full title and requiring repatriation of all the artifacts. In addition, the coins and armaments arguably 
have less “cultural” significance than artwork or other recovered items. This division would allow both 
finders and cultures to keep that which they value most. According to one commentator, “Salvors are 
most likely to be interested in the recovery of bullion, armaments, and other high-value artifacts.” 
Kahn, supra note 28, at 599. 
 161. The procedure for amending UNCLOS is addressed in articles 312 through 316. Since these 
proposed amendments exclusively address activities in the Area, article 314 applies, requiring that 
“[t]he proposed amendment shall be subject to approval by the Assembly following its approval by the 
Council.” UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 314. Additionally, the amendment must not “prejudice the 
system of exploration for and exploitation of the resources in the Area,” subject to the Review 
Conference. Id. Once an amendment is adopted, it must be ratified by two-thirds of the State Parties or 
by sixty State Parties, whichever is greater, within twelve months of its adoption. Id. art. 316.  
 162. The 100-year limitations period is a compromise between two extreme positions. If the 
period is too short, then there is insufficient time for owners to mobilize resources for recovery. If the 
period is too long, then material is less likely to be recoverable. See infra note 164 (describing 
different lengths for existing statutes). 
 163. The statute would begin to run from the date that a ship sinks. Preservationists might raise a 
concern that, in the case of wrecks nearing the end of the limitations period, there would be a frantic 
attempt to locate and recover the wreck in a manner that does not conform to archaeological standards. 
This concern is without merit for a number of reasons. The statute of limitations will only extinguish 
the claims of the owner. While he or she might feel an added pressure to recover his or her vessel 
before the statute runs, everyone else would have an incentive to wait until just after the statute runs. 
Additionally, the statute’s primary purpose is to encourage owners to search for and recover their 
wrecks. The haste needed to locate the sunken shipwreck does not imply that such haste need be made 
in the recovery efforts. As in the current framework, a completely successful salvage would not be 
necessary to assert ownership in American courts. An owner would need only show control over the 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss1/4
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The law would mandatorily apply to all wrecks of the requisite age, and 
the effect would be to forcibly apply the law of finds.164 This statute of 
limitations would be subject to the repatriation provisions discussed 
below. 
Extinguishing ownership claims to older wrecks would incentivize 
recovery of the wrecks by eliminating the need for costly litigation.165 If a 
finder is assured title to any shipwrecks of a certain age, then he or she can 
devote greater resources to search and recovery and fewer to litigation. 
Such a limit would also resolve the ambiguities in the definition of 
abandonment that have plagued the ASA.166 So long as the age of the 
wreck could be determined, there would be no need to litigate the issue of 
abandonment.167  
Such an amendment would extinguish the claims of governments to 
their ancient wrecks. In Odyssey, for example, Spain would not be able to 
 
 
site of the wreck and the ability to affect some recovery. See supra notes 67–68 and accompanying 
text.  
 164. There is legal precedent for imposing time limits on shipwreck claims. Several states have 
enacted time limits within their jurisdictions. Kahn, supra note 28, at 642. North Carolina deems a 
vessel that is left unclaimed for ten years to be abandoned and grants title to the state. N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§ 121-22 (2007). Massachusetts asserts ownership over wrecks that are unclaimed for at least a 
hundred years. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 6, § 180 (2006). 
 165. In addition to the incentives for finders to search for lost wrecks, owners would have 
additional incentives to locate their shipwrecked vessels. The statute of limitations would eliminate 
owners’ ability to remain idle while waiting for someone else to locate their property. The incentive 
for owners to locate their wrecks might also have the effect of spurring technological innovation in the 
field of deep-sea search and recovery equipment. While an individual vessel might not contain enough 
value to make such investment feasible, owners of multiple shipwrecks would have cause to invest. 
The best example would be maritime insurers. Upon the loss of a ship, insurers usually pay out the 
policy, and in the process, acquire title to the ship. As an institutional owner, an insurance company 
would face the greatest incentive to invest in recovery, lest its ownership claims be extinguished by the 
statute of limitations.  
 166. See supra note 113. 
 167. The issue of age would still require litigation in marginal cases. This raises the question of 
how such determinations would be made. Since a court is capable of fact-finding, it is capable of 
making such determinations based upon evidence. There are two possible scenarios that a court might 
face: one in which the identity of the ship is known, and the other when the name is a mystery. 
 If the ship’s name is known, then it is likely that the date of loss is also known. Even with a 
known vessel, disagreement over the date of loss is still possible. However, the court is capable of 
hearing evidence and issuing a finding on the date of loss.  
 In the event that the ship’s name is not known, then there will be a need to date the wreck based 
upon scientific evidence. It could be argued that if the identity is not known, then there would not be 
an owner to intervene, thus mooting the issue. While this argument is logical, Odyssey is an example 
where an owner intervened on the possibility that the unknown ship belonged to Spain.  
 Whether the burden of proof lies with a finder or an intervening owner is a question that the courts 
would need to answer. Presuming that the ship is young until proven old would be a sensible rule. In 
other words, the rebuttable presumption would be that an owner maintains his or her rights unless the 
evidence indicates that the ship is of the requisite age. Such a rule would also add incentive for 
innovations in technology to accurately date sunken shipwrecks.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
204 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 86:181 
 
 
 
 
assert a claim as successor owner of the shipwreck if the wreck is 
determined to be greater than 100 years old.168 Because this effect would 
undoubtedly be unpalatable to many governments, additional incentives 
would be needed to ensure support in the United Nations.169 
B. Limited Repatriation 
In order to secure support for the time limitation, UNCLOS should be 
further amended to provide for the repatriation of cultural property 
recovered from shipwrecks on the high seas, exclusive of coinage and 
armaments. To secure this end, UNCLOS should include a right for 
nations to acquire their cultural property from the finders who successfully 
recover artifacts.170 Finders would receive a salvage award for their 
efforts, with greater amounts being paid to the finders who observe proper 
archaeological techniques in their recovery efforts.171 The amount of the 
salvage award would be determined by the Authority, applying the same 
criteria currently used by courts in making such determinations.  
In defining cultural property, the amendment should favor a cultural 
nationalism definition, whereby the ultimate destination of the recovered 
property will be important. More than one group may wish to assert a 
claim, and in determining which group has the strongest claim to the 
cultural property, the Authority should provide a platform for bilateral or 
multilateral negotiations among the nation of origin, the nation of cultural 
origin, and the nation of historic or archaeological origin.172 The 
 
 
 168. Spain would not be without recourse to assert a claim. Spain simply would not be able to 
base its claim upon its status as successor-owner of the vessel. Spain would still be able to pursue a 
claim based upon its cultural property rights. See infra note 172 and accompanying text. 
 169. National governments would probably stand to lose the most by the implementation of this 
provision. A statute of limitations would extinguish governments’ claims to their own vessels and 
warships after the requisite amount of time. The limited repatriation provision, discussed below, is 
intended to alleviate some of the negative incidence this provision would otherwise inflict upon 
governments. See infra notes 170–78 and accompanying text. 
 170. The term “artifact” here is intended to include all property other than coins or armaments. 
Any other items recovered from a shipwreck, including pieces of the wreck itself, would fall under this 
category.  
 171. Due to the concerns of preservationists, a sliding scale for awards would be necessary to 
ensure that finders respect the historic value of their finds. The award would add worth to the artifacts 
and wrecks that otherwise do not have market value to the finder. Thus, there would be an incentive 
for the finder to skillfully recover the entirety of the wreck rather than simply the precious metals. It 
goes without saying that the salvage award would not cover any coins or armaments recovered, as the 
finder would already receive title to these items. The salvage award would only apply to those items 
subject to repatriation.  
 172. It is very possible that, in most cases, these three groups would be one and the same. The 
negotiation system would not be needed in such a case, and the Authority would proceed to determine 
the salvage award using the same criteria as are presently employed by courts.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss1/4
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competing claimants should then determine the distribution of the 
property,173 and the property should subsequently be repatriated. However, 
in exchange for repatriation of the property, such nations should be 
required to guarantee access to all. Further, the international scientific 
community should be given the right to study any property recovered from 
shipwrecks in international waters.  
The benefits of such an amendment would be numerous. By granting 
nations the right to acquire title to their cultural property, the amendment 
would hopefully garner support among the art-rich nations174 of the world, 
which have historically exported their art. Guaranteeing access for 
scientific research would grant the international scientific community the 
same benefits as if the treaty had adopted a cultural internationalism rule. 
Finally, the compensation provision would ensure that finders still have 
the incentives to recover artifacts that otherwise lack market value.175  
Administration of these amendments should be entrusted to the 
Authority already established under UNCLOS.176 The Authority should be 
charged with overseeing the preservation efforts of finders and setting the 
remuneration awards if a nation chooses to exercise its purchase rights.177 
The amendments would only apply to shipwrecks found in international 
waters, so they would not alter the rights of sovereigns within their own 
territorial waters.  
These amendments would have the benefit of incentivizing the 
recovery of long-lost shipwrecks and their treasures, while simultaneously 
providing a mechanism for the repatriation of cultural property. One 
 
 
 173. The Authority would be responsible for approving any negotiated settlement between the 
parties, in addition to all other administrative matters arising under these provisions. See UNCLOS, 
supra note 1, art. 157(2) (“The powers and functions of the Authority shall be those expressly 
conferred upon it by this Convention.”). The claimants would be responsible for the salvage award. In 
the event that there are no claimants, then the finder/salvor would receive title to the property.  
 174. The term “art-rich nations” refers to those countries which have traditionally produced 
cultural property that has subsequently been exported, either by choice or by force. See Harris, supra 
note 129, at 237. An example would be Egypt, whose antiquities have been removed to museums 
around the world.  
 175. Some proponents of preservation argue that the act of salvaging a shipwreck actually places 
the site in marine peril. They argue instead for “on-site preservation” rather than salvage. See, e.g., 
Varmer, supra note 24, at 287 (“It clearly would be preferable to be able to study the objects where 
they were found.”). However, no American court yet agrees with this position.  
 176. UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 157. The membership of the Authority is governed by article 
156, which states, “All State Parties are ipso facto members of the Authority.” Id. art. 156. 
 177. One commentator has suggested that the government should acquire title to all the artifacts 
salvaged and that salvors should be paid some fixed percentage of the value of the artifacts they 
recover. Del Bianco, supra note 3, at 174. Similarly, by providing a specialized adjudicative body, the 
Authority would remove the need to involve American federal courts in the establishment of salvage 
awards.  
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criticism of statutes such as the ASA, which divest owners of their rights, 
is that the cost and burden of recovery fall on the states, which have 
limited budgets.178 These amendments would address such concerns by 
placing the burden of recovery on salvors, who have the expertise and the 
incentive to locate and recover shipwrecks. Treasure hunters would still 
have an interest in finding shipwrecks, but the scientific community would 
also have access to their finds. By providing for repatriation, with a 
requirement for open access, the amendments would save cultural 
nationalists and scientists from the task of tracking down artifacts and 
acquiring them from private owners.  
C. Return to Odyssey 
If the above recommendations were implemented, how would 
Odyssey’s find and claim be resolved under the new international regime? 
The first issue would be to determine the age of the vessel. Given the 
quantity of coins recovered, as well as any other material retrieved, it 
should be possible to determine the age of the wreck. Assuming, as Spain 
suspects, that the shipwrecked vessel is the Nuestra Señora de las 
Mercedes, then Spain’s ownership claim would be extinguished due to the 
statute of limitations.179 The law of finds would apply, entitling Odyssey 
Marine Exploration to title in all the coins and armaments recovered. The 
remaining artifacts180 would be subject to the repatriation provision 
outlined above. Conceivably, Spain would wish to assert a claim to the 
remaining cultural property; however, Peru or other nations might also 
have claims.181 The disposition of those artifacts would be determined by 
the negotiation procedure available through the Authority. Any salvage 
award would be paid to Odyssey by the nation receiving the property. In 
exchange, Odyssey would need to verify to the Authority that proper 
archaeological procedures were followed in the recovery efforts.  
 
 
 178. “Treasure salvors and their investors perform a service that the federal government is 
unwilling to undertake, yet that costly service must be paid for somehow.” Joseph C. Sweeney, An 
Overview of Commercial Salvage Principles in the Context of Marine Archaeology, 30 J. MAR. L. & 
COM. 185, 201–02 (1999). 
 179. The Nuestra Señora de las Mercedes was sunk in 1804. Anderson, supra note 38. The statute 
of limitations for Spain’s ownership claim would have expired 100 years from that time, in 1904.  
 180. It has been reported that in addition to gold and silver coinage, Odyssey recovered artifacts, 
but the exact nature of the artifacts recovered is unknown. Aguayo, supra note 32.  
 181. Such a claim assumes, as one commentator has, that some of the artifacts originated in 
Spain’s New World colonies. Editorial, supra note 31.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss1/4
 
 
 
 
 
 
2008] THAR BE TREASURE HERE 207 
 
 
 
 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
With the advent of more sophisticated technology for the search and 
recovery of deep-sea shipwrecks, the issue of ownership of wrecks on the 
high seas has achieved increasing prominence. The present conflicts 
among finders/salvors, owners, governments, preservationists, and cultural 
property advocates show the inadequacy of the current laws governing 
shipwrecks in international waters. The case of Odyssey Marine 
Exploration, Inc. v. Unidentified, Shipwrecked Vessel182 demonstrates the 
need for reform of this antiquated area of law.  
In furtherance of such reform, this Note suggests an amendment to the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea that would (1) relieve 
the need for litigation in order to determine ownership to ancient wrecks, 
(2) incentivize the discovery and retrieval of ancient wrecks, and (3) 
provide a mechanism for the repatriation of cultural property. By 
achieving these goals, such an amendment would promote the discovery 
and retrieval of ancient shipwrecks on the high seas, spur the development 
of more sophisticated deep-sea technologies, ensure scientific access to 
archaeological material, preserve historic value, and promote cultural 
property. These benefits would come at the cost of clarifying the muddy 
waters of salvage and finds laws. Treasure hunters would be able to keep 
their coins, while archaeologists and preservationists would be able to 
study their artifacts without having to privately acquire them from 
disparate collections. For minimal cost, nations have an opportunity to 
clarify the state of shipwreck law so as to benefit all interested parties. 
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